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OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD BRADSHAW, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WALTER W. KERSHAW, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
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HELEN G. KERSHAW, 
Defendant, 
and 
WILLARD B. ROGERS, EDWARD B. 
R O G E R S and ROCKEFELLER 
LAND & LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT RONALD BRADSHAW 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought in equity by Plaintiff-Re-
spondent Ronald Bradshaw for the purpose of compelling 
specific performance of an option agreement covering 
real property and appurtenant water rights located in 
Millard County, Utah. 
Case No. 
13502 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial was commenced before a jury, but after 
several days of trial and based upon the opening state-
ments, proposed jury instructions submitted and argu-
ment of all counsel, the Court ruled that the case was 
one involving specific performance and that the jury 
should be dismissed. The Court thereupon proceeded to 
hear and determine the matter sitting without the jury. 
Upon conclusion of all evidence and based upon the sub-
mission of legal authorities, the Trial Court ordered that 
the option agreement in question be specifically performed 
by Appellant Walter W. Kershaw and doterniined that 
the interest of Respondent Ronald Bradshaw in the sub-
ject property was superior to the interest claimed by 
Appellant Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Ronald Bradshaw seeks affirmance of 
the Judgment and Order entered by the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was initiated in January of 1971 by Re-
spondent Ronald Bradshaw, hereinafter referred to as 
"Bradshaw", against Appellant Walter W. Kershaw, here-
inafter referred to as "Kershaw", seeking specific per-
formance of an option agreement covering real property 
and appurtenant water rights located in Millard County, 
Utah. In the event that the option agreement could not 
be performed, Bradshaw sought alternative relief in the 
form of a money judgment. 
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In October of 1971, a Second Amended Complaint 
(R. 49) was filed in which Appellants Willard B. Rogers, 
Edward B. Rogers and Rockefeller Land & Livestock Com-
pany (hereinafter Williard B. Rogers Mid Edward B. 
Rogers will be collectively referred to as "Rogers" and 
Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company will be referred 
to as "Rockefeller") were joined as Defendants. The 
Second Cause of Action of the Complaint alleged that 
these parties had acquired an interest in the property 
claimed by Bradshaw under the option agreement, but 
that their interest was subject and inferior to the inter-
est of Bradshaw. 
A Counterclaim was filed by Kershaw against Brad-
shaw seeking damages for the alleged taking of certain 
farm equipment. However, at the start of the trial, Ker-
shaw moved to dismiss the Counterclaim (Tr. 8) and 
this Motion was granted by the Court. 
A Counterclaim (R. 65) was filed by Rockefeller 
against Bradshaw asserting an affirmative, superior claim 
to the property described in Bradshaw's Complaint. Rock-
efeller also filed a Cross-Claim (R. 68) against Kershaw 
alleging that certain representations and warranties were 
given by Kershaw in connection with a sale of the subject 
property to Rockefeller and asking for judgment against 
Kershaw in the event that the Court ultimately deter-
mined that Bradshaw was entitled to the property. 
The trial commenced on October 31, 1972, and occu-
pied four days. Following the conclusion of the trial, the 
Court entered a Memorandum Decision (R. 136) in favor 
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of Bradshaw and directed counsel to prepare and file pro-
posed findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment. 
Such were filed and, after considering certain objections 
with respect thereto, the Trial Court entered its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment and Order 
(R. 231) directing Kershaw to specifically perform the 
option agreement, holding that Bradshaw's interest in the 
subject property was superior to that of Rockefeller, and 
dismissing Rockefeller's Counterclaim and Cross-Claim. 
Kershaw, Rogers and Rockefeller have all appealed the 
decision of the Trial Court. 
The property involved in this suit consists of 560 
acres of real property and a 6 c.f.s. well permit. Mr. Ker-
shaw, a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah, began acquiring 
property in Millard County in 1969 (Tr. 141) with the 
intention of putting together a large-scale famiing opera-
tion. The particular property involved in this suit was 
acquired by Kershaw as follows: 
1. Parcel No. 1, consisting of 480 acres of real prop-
erty, was purchased from Marion Kesler in July 
of 1969 (See Exhibit P-3 and Tr. 32-36, 143-149). 
2. Parcel No. 2, consisting of 80 acres of real prop-
erty, was being purchased by Kershaw from Grace 
W. Staples (See Exhibit P-4 and Tr. 521). 
3. The 6 c.f.s. well permit was acquired from Milo 
and Boyd Watts (See Exhibit P-4 and Tr. 142, 
143). 
During the time that this property was being acquired 
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by Kershaw, he was being assisted by Milton A. Chris-
tensen, whom he had authorized to act on his behalf. 
By the middle of 1970, Mr. Kershaw had decided 
that he did not want to follow through with Ins original 
intention of establishing a farming operation in Millard 
County and he approached Milton Christensen, who had 
assisted him in acquiring the property, to see if Chris-
tensen would be able to raise some money and take over 
Kershaw's interest in the various pieces of property in 
Millard County (Tr. 151, 152, 534). As a result of this 
discussion the option agreement (Exhibit P-4), which 
the trial court ordered be specifically performed, was 
signed. 
The document, entitled "Option to Purchase Real 
Property", is dated August 8, 1970. Kershaw testified 
that he recalled having signed it on July 20 or 21, 1970 
(Tr. 510) and Christensen, the other party to the agree-
ment, could not recall the exact date on which it was 
signed (Tr. 157). Whether the actual date of the execu-
tion of the document was July 20, 1970 or August 8, 
1970, is immaterial, however, since the term of the option 
was one year and the date on which the option was exer-
cised was well within that one-year period, even assum-
ing the July date. 
The option agreement (Exhibit P-4) recites that 
$100 was paid by the optionee (Christensen) to the op-
tionor (Kershaw) and it further sets forth in paragraph 
2 that the efforts of the optionee to obtain a loan from 
the Farmers Home Administration would constitute a 
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part of the consideration for the option. Such a loan 
application was submitted to the Farmers Home Admin-
istration on July 20, 1970 but, after due consideration 
within the agency, the application was rejected on Sep-
tember 15, 1970 (See Exhibit D-4). 
Other essential terms of the option agreement are 
as follows: 
1. Term of option — one year (paragraph 8). 
2. Property — a full legal description for 560 acres 
of real property and a well permit is included 
(paragraph 1). 
3. Purchase price — $10,050.00 (paragraph 2). 
4. Manner of exercise — a written notice of accep-
tance was required to be given by the optionee 
to the optionor (paragraph 8). 
5. Termination — irrevocable for four months; there-
after a written notice of termination could be 
given (paragraph 8). 
6. Manner of performance — described property 
was to be conveyed by warranty deed, free and 
clear of all encumbrances (paragraphs 1 and 6). 
Following the date on which the option agreement 
was executed, Mr. Christensen, the optionee, had posses-
sion of the property described in the agreement (Tr. 167). 
He lived in Meadow, Utah, which is very close to where 
the property is located (See Exhibit P-l), and he con-
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ducted a farming business on the property (Tr. 167,168), 
part of which included entering into an agreement to feed 
livestock thereon (Exhibit P-6 and Tr. 168-173) in No-
vember of 1970. In addition to the notice which was avail-
able through Christensen's active possession of the prop-
erty, it is undisputed in the record that prior to the time 
that it acquired any interest in the property, the agents 
and employees of Rockefeller had been repeatedly ad-
vised of the existence of the option and of the fact that 
Mr. Christensen claimed an interest in the property 
covered thereby (Tr. 53-55,120-128,187-191, 369-371, 549, 
550, 554, 555). 
Under date of December 1, 1970, Mr. Christensen, 
with the assistance of his attorney, Weston L. Bayles, 
gave formal written notice (Exhibit P-7) to Kershaw 
that he accepted the option. Kershaw acknowledged hav-
ing received a copy of the notice of acceptance, with a 
copy of the option agreement, by registered mail on De-
cember 2, 1970 (Tr. 512) and that about the same time 
Mr. Christensen and Mr. Bayles personally visited him 
and discussed the option with him. 
Notwithstanding the receipt of the notice of accep-
tance on December 2,1970, fifteen days later, on Decem-
ber 17, 1970, Kershaw and his wife executed documents 
(Exhibits D-7 and D-9) conveying a number of pieces 
of property in Millard County to Rockefeller. The prop-
erty conveyed by Kershaw to Rockefeller included Parcel 
# 1 but not Parcel # 2 of the property covered by the 
option agreement (Exhibit P-4). At the time that the 
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conveyances from Kershaw to Rockefeller were executed 
on December 17, 1970, Kershaw informed Rogers and 
Rockefeller that he would hold their $5,000 check until 
December 31, 1970, and that if, during that two week 
period, they had any misgivings at all about the deal that 
they had made he would return their check and rescind 
the transaction (Tr. 552, 553). 
On January 7, 1971, all of the right, title and inter-
est of Milton W. Christensen and his wife, in and to the 
option agreement and the property covered thereby were 
assigned to Bradshaw (Exhibit P-5). On the following 
day, January 8, 1971, Bradshaw, with the assistance of 
his coimsel, formally advised Kershaw that a sum of 
money had been deposited in escrow and that the balance 
due under the option agreement would be paid to him 
upon receipt, by the escrow agent, of a properly executed 
warranty deed (See Exhibit E, attached to the Plaintiff's 
Complaint at page 13 of the Record, and Exhibit P-9). 
When Kershaw refused to deliver such a deed, this action 
for specific performance was initiated. 
A brief summary of the witnesses called and their 
testimony is as follows: 
I. Bradshaw9s witnesses: 
A. Marion Leon Kesler — Testified that he had 
acquired an interest in the 480 acres shown as Parcel # 1 
on Exhibit P-4, together with additional property, from 
Grant and Grace Staples in 1966 (Tr. 22) and that he 
had conveyed the 480 acres to Kershaw in July of 1969 
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(Tr. 34). He further testified that he was aware of the 
option which had been given by Kershaw to Christensen 
(Tr. 41) and that he personally discussed the option with 
Willard B. Rogers in October of 1970 (Tr. 53, 54). 
B. Jearald Gorden Rowen — Worked for Milton 
Christensen on the 480 acres of property shown as Parcel 
# 1 on Exhibit P-4 (Tr. 117) and in both August of 1970 
(Tr. 121) and November of 1970 (Tr. 125), he heard 
Christensen advise Willard B. Rogers of the fact that 
he (Christensen) had an option on the property. 
C. Milton Christensen — Testified that he worked 
as a representative of Kershaw (Tr. 142) in acquiring 
properties in Millard County, including the 480 acres 
shown as Parcel # 1 on Exhibit P-4 (Tr. 144) and the 6 
cf.s. well permit (Tr. 142). In 1970, Kershaw desired to 
have Christensen take over the properties in which he 
(Kershaw) had acquired an interest (Tr. 151). As a 
result, Kershaw gave Christensen an option (Exhibit P-4) 
covering 560 acres of property plus a well permit (Tr. 154). 
An application for a loan, with the property covered by 
the option to serve as collateral, was submitted to and 
denied by the Farmers Home Administration in 1970 (Tr. 
166). Thereafter, Christensen remained in possession of 
the property (Tr. 167). Christensen testified that on 
December 1, 1970 he gave written notice of his intention 
to exercise the option to Kershaw (Tr. 173, 174). Chris-
tensen also testified that he personally advised Willard 
B. Rogers of Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company 
of the existence of the option and of his (Christensen's) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
claim to the property covered thereby in August of 1970 
(Tr. 189) and in November of 1970 (Tr. 190). Finally, 
Christensen testified that he assigned the option agree-
ment to Bradshaw in January of 1971 (Tr. 192). 
D. Grace W. Staples — Stated that she agreed with 
Marion Kesler to release the 480 acres (Parcel # 1 on 
Exhibit P-4) out of the escrow in which it was being held 
(Tr. 325). 
E. Respondent Ronald Bradshaw — Testified that 
the option agreement was assigned to him in January 
of 1971 (Tr. 335, 336) and that he immediately thereafter 
tendered the balance of the purchase price due thereunder 
to Kershaw (Tr. 381). Mr. Bradshaw also testified to 
a conversation with WiUard B. Rogers in November of 
1970 in which he (Bradshaw) specifically mentioned the 
fact that Christensen had an option on the property (Tr. 
370, 371). 
F. Elizabeth Knkerton — Testified that Kershaw 
acknowledged that an option in favor of Christensen had 
been given in August of 1970 (Tr. 469-471). 
G. Wilbur Harding — Called as an appraiser to 
place a value on the property involved in the suit. 
II. Kershaw's Witness: 
The only witness called by Kershaw was Lee A. 
Wankier, who testified that the loan application sub-
mitted by Milton Christensen to the Farmers Home Ad-
ministration was denied on September 15, 1970 (Exhibit 
D-4). 
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III. Witness of Rogers and Rockefeller: 
The only witness called by Rogers and Rockefeller 
was Appellant Walter W. Kershaw. He testified that on 
December 17, 1970, he and his wife conveyed property 
to Rockefeller (Tr. 500, 501), and that prior to that date 
he had advised Rogers and Rockefeller of the fact that 
Christensen claimed an interest in the property pursuant 
to an option agreement (Tr. 549, 550). With respect 
to the option agreement (Exhibit P-4), Kershaw testified 
that he signed the document on July 20 or 21, 1970, (Tr. 
510) and that at the time that he signed it portions of the 
agreement were in blank (Tr. 510-514). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE OPTION AGREEMENT IS A VALID 
AND ENFORCEABLE LEGAL DOCUMENT 
AND IT HAD NOT BEEN TERMINATED 
AT THE TIME THAT IT WAS EXERCISED. 
In order for specific performance of an agreement 
to be required, the basic terms of the agreement must be 
clear (Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P. 2d 491 
(1967). A review of the option agreement (Exhibit P-4), 
which the trial court ordered Kershaw to specifically per-
form, will show that the terms of the agreement are 
clear and definite and that specific performance is an 
appropriate remedy: 
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1. Subject matter — The property covered by the 
option is clearly and specifically described. 
2. Parties — Milton A. Christensen and Walter W. 
Kershaw are listed as the "buyer" and "seller", 
respectively, and both signed the document. 
3. Consideration — The agreement recites that 
$100.00 consideration had been paid and Chris-
tensen testified (Tr. 164, 165) that such a pay-
ment was in fact made. The agreement also pro-
vides that the optionee's efforts to obtain a loan 
would constitute a part of the consideration for 
the option. There is no question that Christen-
sen did make an effort to obtain such a loan (Ex-
hibit D-4). 
4. Manner of performance — Paragraph 8 provides 
that the option can be exercised at any time while 
it remains in force by mailing or delivering a 
"written notice of acceptance" to the offeror. In 
return for the payment of the balance owing un-
der the agreement ($9,950.00), the optionor is 
obligated to convey the described property by 
general warranty deed (paragraph 6) "free and 
clear of all encumbrances" (paragraph 1). 
5. Duration of the contract — Paragraph 8 provides 
that the offer will remain irrevocable for a period 
of four months and that it will remain in force 
therafter until one year from the date of the 
agreement 
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6. Manner of termination — The document, in para-
graph 8, provides a specific procedure for term-
ination after the four months' irrevocable period. 
(Kershaw has never contended that he took the 
steps outlined to terminate the offer — the most 
that he has contended is that the rejection of 
the loan application by the Farmers Home Ad-
ministration "frustrated and terminated the entire 
contract" (see page 10 of the original Kershaw 
brief)). 
With respect to the matter of termination, Kershaw 
urges in Point I of his original brief that the option "had 
no vitality after the loan application was rejected". He 
cites a number of Utah cases which have held that in in-
terpreting agreements the courts are obligated to care-
fully consider the specific language of the contract. He 
then goes on, in what the Respondent believes is a rather 
remarkable non sequitur, to do exactly what the authori-
ties which he cites have said that you should not do, and 
ignores the very specific language of the contract relating 
to termination. In contending that the option agreement 
automatically terminated when the loan application was 
rejected, Kershaw is attempting to read something into 
the agreement which simply is not there, in clear viola-
tion of the Parol Evidence Rule. Nowhere does the con-
tract provide any such thing. What the agreement does 
say is that the option will last for a period of one year 
unless it is earlier terminated by the specific procedure 
outlined. 
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Respondent is in full agreement with the authorities 
cited by Appellant Kershaw to the effect that the court 
should "determine what the parties intended by what 
they said". Nowhere in the written agreement in ques-
tion here did the parties say that a rejection of the con-
templated loan application would result in a termination 
of the option. The agreement provides only two ways 
for the option to be terminated: 
1. By the passage of one year from the date of the 
agreement, or 
2. By the giving of a notice of termination in the 
manner set forth in paragraph 8. 
Inasmuch as neither one of these things had hap-
pened at the time of the exercise of the option, the con-
clusion is inescapable that the option agreement was in 
force and that it was capable of being exercised at that 
time. 
In Point III of his original brief, Kershaw suggests 
that what the trial court concluded was an enforceable 
legal agreement actually contained fatal ambiguities. 
Kershaw does not contend (and the evidence did not 
show) that he had no interest in the real property and 
the well permit covered by the option agreement. On 
the contrary, the evidence clearly showed that he had an 
interest in each piece of property. His interest in Parcel 
No. 1 was obtain from Marion L. Kesler (Exhibit P-3); 
his interest in the 6 c.f.s. well permit was obtained from 
Milo and Boyd Watts (as Exhibit P-4 recites); and his 
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interest in Parcel No. 2 was being purchased under a con-
tract between Grace W. Staples and Walter W. Kershaw 
(as Exhibit P-4 recites). 
The fact that the agreement allocates the total pur-
chase price for the property ($10,050.00) between the two 
parcels — $7,200.00 for Parcel No. 1 and $2,850.00 for 
Parcel No. 2 — is certainly not a source of ambiguity. 
Neither is it a problem that Kershaw's interest was 
derived from separate agreements on which there were 
payables at the time that the option agreement was en-
tered into. In Point III of his original brief, Kershaw 
asserts that his right to obtain Parcel No. 1 was depen-
dant on the payment of certain money in connection with 
the "Staples escrow" and that Bradshaw was aware of 
this. He then goes on to cite cases dealing with a "mutual 
mistake of fact". In the first place, if everyone involved 
in the situation was fully aware of the status of the prop-
erty, there is clearly no mutual mistake of fact. In the 
second place, it is a very common practice for people to 
agree to convey title to property which they have only 
a contractual right to acquire or to agree to convey mar-
ketable title to property on which there are, at the time 
of the agreement, liens and encumbrances. That this is 
a legitimate procedure is evident from the following: 
"It is not unusual for persons to agree to con-
vey by a certain time, notwithstanding they have 
no title to the land at the time of the contract, 
and the validity of such agreements is upheld. 
In such cases, the vendor assumes the risk of 
acquiring the title and making the conveyance, 
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or responding in damages for the vendee's loss 
of his bargain. One having an option to purchase 
real estate has a legal right to enter into an ex-
ecutory contract to sell the property. A fortiori, 
it is not necessary that the vendor be the abso-
lute owner of the property at the time he enters 
into the agreement of sale. An equitable estate 
in land, or a right to become the owner of the 
land, is as much the subject of sale as is the land 
itself, and whenever one is so situated with ref-
erence to a tract of land that he can acquire the 
title thereto, either by the voluntary act of the 
parties holding the title, or by proceedings at 
law or in equity, he is in a position to make a 
valid agreement for the sale thereof . . ." 55 
Am. Jur., "Vendor and Purchaser", § 12. 
At the time that the option agreement was entered into, 
Kershaw either owned or had a clear legal right to acquire 
everything that he agreed to sell. Upon the exercise of 
the option, he was (and is) in a position to perform by 
acquiring the title to the real property covered by the 
option from Staples pursuant to his contractual right to 
do so. 
Answering Point IV of the brief of Rogers and Rock-
efeller, the option agreement (Exhibit P-4) clearly shows 
what the parties thereto intended. All of the terms of 
the contract are clear and definite and the required mu-
tuality is present. The trial court was correct in ordering 
that it be specifically performed. 
POINT II. 
THE EXERCISE OF THE OPTION AND 
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THE TENDER OF PERFORMANCE BY RE-
SPONDENT WERE PROPER AND IN AC-
CORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE 
AGREEMENT. 
In Corbin on Contracts, (One Volume Edition, 1952), 
at § 264, the author reviews the legal transformation that 
takes place in connection with the acceptance of an option 
as follows: 
1. A person who holds an option which was given 
for a consideration holds a "power of acceptance". 
The optionor is subject to a binding contract, but 
his duty to convey is conditional upon receiving 
notice of acceptance in the manner provided in 
the option agreement. 
2. The giving of a notice of acceptance by the of-
feree amounts to the performance of a condition 
precedent to the offeror's duty of immediate per-
formance. The giving of the notice does not 
make a new contract — it merely advances an 
existing contractual obligation one step further 
along its way, turning the duty of the offeror 
that was conditional on notice into a duty that 
is no longer so conditional. 
3. Nevertheless, even after the notice of acceptance 
is given, the offeror's duty to convey is still con-
ditional upon the tender of the purchase price 
within a reasonable time. As soon as such a ten-
der is made, the offeror has an immediate, en-
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forceable obligation to convey the property cov-
ered by the option. 
As indicated above, the record is clear that the option 
agreement (Exhibit P-4), which the trial court ordered 
Kershaw to perform, was supported by consideration and 
that it had not terminated, either by the passage of time 
or by the giving of the required termination notice, at 
the time of the acceptance and tender in December of 
1970 and January of 1971. 
A brief review of the steps taken in connection with 
the acceptance and tender might be helpful in demon-
strating that the Respondent met his burden of proving 
that he "exercised the option in accordance with its 
terms." Lincoln Land and Development Co. v. Thompson, 
26 Utah 2d 324, 489 P. 2d 426 (1971). 
1. On December 1, 1970, a notice (Exhibit P-7) 
signed by Milton Christensen (the optionee) and 
by his attorney was mailed to Kershaw (the op-
tionor) notifying him that Christensen "accepts 
the option granted him August 8, 1970." The 
notice of acceptance contains a description of the 
property and it refers to the agreed purchase 
price. Kershaw acknowledged at the trial that 
he received a copy of Exhibit P-7 by registered 
mail on December 2, 1970 (Tr. 512). The giving 
of the notice of acceptance in this manner con-
formed exactly with the procedure outlined by 
paragraph 8 of the option agreement. 
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2. Following the assignment of Christensen's rights 
under the option agreement to Respondent Ron-
ald Bradshaw on January 7, 1971 (Exhibit P-5), 
Bradshaw immediately proceeded to tender the 
balance of the purchase price which was due un-
der the agreement ($10,050 price, less $100 down 
payment = $9,950 balance due). This was done 
by mailing a letter to Kershaw (Exhibit E, at-
tached to the plaintiff's complaint, found at page 
13 of the Record — in his answer Kershaw ack-
nowledged that this notice was, in fact, given 
and thus no evidence relating thereto was pre-
sented at the time of the trial — see also Tr. 382 
relating to the tender offer) in which Bradshaw, 
through his counsel, specifically tendered to Ker-
shaw the balance owing under the option agree-
ment — $9,950. With the letter was a copy of 
an escrow instructions letter (Exhibit P-9) ad-
dressed to Security Title Company of Salt Lake 
City and a blank warranty deed for execution 
by Kershaw and his wife. 
3. The escrow agent, Security Title Company, was 
instructed to hold the money which was deposited 
and to pay $9,950 over to Kershaw upon receiv-
ing a warranty deed signed by Kershaw and his 
wife conveying the property described in the op-
tion agreement. 
Utah has a statute (Utah Code Annotated § 78-
27-1 (1953)) which provides as follows: 
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"An offer in writing to pay a particular sum 
of money or to deliver a written instrument or 
specific personal property, is, if not accepted, 
equivalent to the actual production and tender 
of the money, instrument or property." 
The Trial Court specifically found, in paragraph 8 of its 
Findings of Fact, that the Respondent's tender offer to 
pay the balance owing under the option agreement was 
proper and sufficient under the statute referred to above. 
Appellant Kershaw has raised two questions with 
reference to the tender of performance of the Respondent: 
1. The first contention is that in requiring that Ker-
shaw's wife execute the warranty deed, the Re-
spondent asked for something more than was 
provided for in the option agreement (Point IV 
of Kershaw's original brief), and 
2. The second point is that in instructing the escrow 
agent to show "Grace Staples, individually and 
as Guardian of the Estate of Grant D. Staples" 
as a payee on the check which was to be delivered 
to Kershaw, the Respondent thereby recognized 
certain "uncertainties and ambiguities of the op-
tion agreement" (Point II of Appellant Kershaw's 
second brief). 
With respect to the first alleged defect in Bradshaw's 
tender, it is true that the blank deed which was delivered 
to Kershaw in connection with Bradshaw's tender called 
for the signature of his wife. The deed was prepared in 
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this manner because the option agreement obKgates the 
optionor to convey title "free and clear of all encum-
brances" (paragraph 1) and it further requires the con-
veyance of "a valid, unencumbered, indefeasible fee-simple 
title to said property" (paragraph 6). A married grantor 
simply cannot convey such title unless his wife joins in 
the conveyance or unless other steps are taken to elimin-
ate her statutory inchoate interest in the property (Utah 
Code Annotated, § 74-4-3 (1953), as indicated by the 
following: 
"The purchaser in a contract for the sale of 
land, entitled to a conveyance of a marketable 
title, free and clear of encumbrances, is entitled 
to a conveyance free and clear of any outstanding 
right of dower or courtesy, or of any statutory 
right or interest of a spouse of the vendor or of 
any grantor in his claim of title. While it is not 
essential to the validity of a contract for the sale 
of land that the spouse of the vendor join in the 
execution of the contract in the absence of any 
statutory requirement of such joinder, it is essen-
tial, in order to convey a marketable title, that 
a spouse who has a dower or courtesy interest 
in the title join in the execution of the vendor's 
deed. Title to land is not "marketable" in the 
sense of that term as used with reference to the 
obligation of the vendor to convey a marketable 
title when there is in the chain of title a deed not 
joined in by the spouse of the grantor, living at 
the time of the execution of the deed, unless it 
is made to appear that such defect is cured 
by the lapse of time, or in some other 
way. // the vendor has a wife living at the time 
of the performance of his contract to convey and 
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she has not released her inchoate dower interest 
or statutory rights in lieu thereof\ her joinder in 
the execution of the deed is essential in order 
to enable the vendor to convey a marketable 
title. He alone cannot convey a marketable title 
since in such case there would be the outstanding 
dower or statutory interest in the wife." (Em-
phasis added.) 55 Am. Jur. "Vendor and Pur-
chaser" § 243. 
Thus, in order for there not to be an immediate breach 
of paragraphs 1 and 6 of the agreement and of the statu-
tory covenants set forth in Utah Code Annotated, § 57-
1-12 (1953), it was essential that Kershaw's wife join in 
the conveyance to Bradshaw. The proposed warranty 
deed which was forwarded to Kershaw (Exhibit P-9) did 
call for the signature of Dorothy Kershaw, as the wife 
of Walter W. Kershaw. If, as the record reflects (Tr. 500 
and Exhibit D-7 and D-9), Kershaw was at this time 
married to Helen Kershaw rather than Dorothy Kershaw, 
it would have been a very simple matter for him to have 
either substituted Helen's name for the name of Dorothy 
or to have arranged for a new deed to be prepared con-
taining the name of Helen Kershaw. 
It is also interesting to note that the conveyances 
(Exhibits D-7 and D-9), which were executed by Ker-
shaw in favor of Rockefeller on December 17, 1970 (15 
days after Kershaw acknowledged having received the 
notice of acceptance of the option from Milton Christen-
sen) were executed by his wife, Helen Kershaw. For 
Kershaw to complain about having been asked to obtain 
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the signature of his wife on a warranty deed at a time 
very close to the time when she joined him in executing 
several conveyances in favor of other persons is a very 
questionable maneuver and Bradshaw believes that it 
illustrates that the Appellants have attempted to grasp 
any straw, no matter how insubstantial, in opposing 
Bradshaw's right to the relief to which he is clearly en-
titled. 
Kershaw has also expressed concern about the fact 
that the escrow agent, in the Escrow Instructions Letter 
(Exhibit P-9), was asked to show Mrs. Grace Staples, 
individually and as guardian of the estate of her husband, 
as a payee on the check to be delivered to Kershaw. The 
record clearly shows that in order for Kershaw to be able 
to convey marketable title to the property, as he obligated 
himself in the option agreement (Exhibit P-4) to do, he 
had to (1) get the 480 acre piece (Parcel No. 1) ex-
tracted from an escrow agreement, in which the property 
was being held for the benefit of Mr. and Mrs. Staples, 
the "Sellers" (See Exhibits P-2 and P-3) and (2) in 
order for him to be able to convey the 80 acre piece (Par-
cel No. 2), he had to pay off a separate contract which 
he had with Mr. and Mrs. Staples (See paragraph 1 of 
Exhibit P-4 and Tr. 151, 152). The Court can take judi-
cial notice of the fact that it is an extremely common 
practice in real estate transactions for the buyer to in-
clude as payees on his check which is delivered to the 
seller the names of persons who have an interest in the 
property which must be cleared in order for the seller to 
be able to convey marketable title. This protects the 
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buyer and generally isn't a problem to the seller since 
he must "make his peace" with the persons claiming the 
interest anyway. 
In asking for the signature of Mrs. Kershaw on the 
deed and in instructing the escrow agent to include Mrs. 
Staples as a payee on the check to be delivered to Mr. 
Kershaw, Bradshaw was merely taking well accepted and 
prudent steps to protect himself. These things did not 
place an additional burden on Kershaw and they did not 
affect in any way the legality of Bradshaw's acceptance 
and tender under the option agreement. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DISCHARGING T H E 
JURY AND PROCEEDING TO HEAR AND 
DECIDE THE CASE. 
In the Judgment which was entered by the trial 
court on August 28, 1973 (R. 231), the court's reasons 
for discharging the jury midway through the trial were 
set forth in some detail as follows: 
1. The plaintiff's primary claim for relief was spe-
cific performance (an alternative claim for dam-
ages had been abandoned). 
2. The counterclaim of Kershaw for damages had 
been dismissed on Kershaw's own motion. 
3. The opening statements of counsel for Kershaw 
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and Rogers, as well as that of Bradshaw, all 
pointed to specific performance as the essential 
issue in dispute. 
4. The proposed jury instructions of all parties were 
addressed to specific performance. 
In Point III of the Rogers brief, four separate issues 
are listed which they contend entitled them to a jury 
trial. An examination of the Usted issues in the context 
of the lawsuit will disclose that all four of them relate 
only to whether Bradshaw was entitled to have the option 
agreement (Exhibit P-4) specifically performed. 
The rule is not uncertain in this jurisdiction that 
an action for specific performance is purely equitable 
(Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 381 P. 2d 78 (1963), 
and that, 
"If the question respecting title is equitable, 
no party is, as a matter of right, entitled to a 
jury trial . . .". Ketchum Coal Co. v. District 
Court, 48 Utah 342, 159 Pac. 737 (1916). 
Such precedent of this Court is in harmony with the 
law throughout the Country, as indicated by the follow-
ing: 
"The remedy of speicfic performance of contracts 
is purely equitable; courts of law have no power 
to compel specific performance of any kind of 
contract". 49 Am. Jur., "Specific Performance", 
§2. 
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"The right to trial by jury does not extend to 
cases of equity jurisdiction, and if it is conceded 
or clearly shown that a case belongs to this class, 
the trial of the questions involved in it belongs 
to the court itself, no matter what may be its im-
portance or complexity. Equitable actions as 
such are not within the constitutional provisions 
that the right of trial by jury shall remain in-
violate . . .". 47 Am. Jur., 2d, "Jury", § 32. 
While it is submitted that no reasonable doubt ex-
isted as to the essential nature of the case as being 
one of specific performance, it is appropriate to note that 
where there is any doubt as to whether the case is one 
in equity or one in law, the trial court is vested with 
sound discretion in determining whether the trial should 
be to the court or to a jury. In the case of Sweeney v. 
Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P. 2d 126 (1966), 
the Court held as follows: 
"In circumstances where doubt exists as to 
whether the cause should be regarded as one in 
equity, or one in law wherein the party can in-
sist on a jury as a matter of right, the trial 
court should have some latitude of discretion. 
In making that determination it is not bound by 
the ostensible form of the action, nor by the par-
ticular wording of the pleadings. It may examine 
into the nature of the rights asserted and the 
remedies sought in the light of the facts of the 
case to ascertain which predominates; and from 
that determination make the appropriate order 
as to a jury or non-jury trial . . . it is the pre-
rogative of the judge who actually tries the case 
to make the determination. Unless it is shown 
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that the ruling was patently in error or an abuse 
of discretion, this court will not interfere with 
the ruling thereon" (Emphasis added.) 
In the very recent case of Corbet v. Cox, 30 Utah 2d 361, 
517 P. 2d 1318 (1974), this Court reaffirmed the discre-
tion vested in the trial court and in so doing cited with 
approval the language set forth above from Sweeney. 
A brief discussion of Rockefeller's claim for quiet 
title will help to demonstrate that no legal issue was 
raised by the evidence which entitled it to a jury trial 
as a matter of right. The document under which Brad-
shaw's interest is vested in the subject property (Exhibit 
P-4), is dated August 8, 1970; the document under which 
Rockefeller asserts an interest in said property (Exhibit 
D-9) is dated December 17, 1970. Since Rockefeller's 
interest in the property came into being more than four 
months after the interest under which Bradshaw claims 
came into being, in order for Rockefeller to prevail, it 
had to establish that it was a bona fide purchaser for 
value, having no notice of the option and the claim of 
the optionee thereunder. The evidence was totally in-
consistent with this position. Virtually all of the witnesses 
testified that Rockefeller and its agents had knowledge, 
either actual or constructive, of the option and the claim 
of Milton Christensen thereunder at the time that Rocke-
feller acquired its interest in the property. These wit-
nesses included: 
Marion Leon Kesler — Tr. 53-55 
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Jearald Gordon Rowan — Tr. 120-128 
Milton Christensen — Tr. 167,168,187-191 
Ronald Bradshaw — Tr. 369-371 
Walter W. Kershaw — Tr. 549, 550, 554, 555 
In the face of this profusion of evidence that Rocke-
feller had full knowledge of the option and the claim of 
Milton Christensen, Bradshaw's assignor, at the time it 
acquired its interest in the property in question, Rogers 
and Rockefeller chose to simply rest their case. The 
Rogers did not take the stand personally to deny having 
had such knowledge and they did not call any other 
witnesses to help support their claim that Rockefeller was 
a bona fide purchaser for value. Thus, the evidence pre-
sented by the Respondent on this issue remained com-
pletely unchallenged. Under these circumstances, even 
if the jury had not been discharged, the Court would have 
had no choice but to direct a verdict on this issue, since 
the testimony did not give rise to any factual dispute on 
the point. 
In short, the jury was properly discharged since the 
basic nature of the case was equitable and involved a claim 
for specific performance. The correctness of excusing the 
jury was clearly shown when the quiet title aspect of 
the case was not even put in issue as a result of the Rogers' 
failure to present any evidence in support of their posi-
tion. 
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POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE RESPON-
DENT. 
The trial court awarded Bradshaw, pursuant to a 
provision in paragraph 4 of Exhibit P-4, $2,000 in attor-
ney's fees. The language in question obligates the Seller 
(optionor) to pay "all expenses of title clearance . . . 
including . . . attorney's fees." Respondent submits that 
this contractual agreement is sufficient under the estab-
lished rule that such fees can be awarded only where 
they are authorized by express agreement or statute. 
{Humphries v. Remco, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 348, 517 P. 2d 
1309 (1974)). 
Appellant Kershaw argues that this provision was 
included only for the benefit of the government. How-
ever, the government is not even a party to the agreement. 
It is a two-party contract between Bradshaw's assignor 
and Appellant Kershaw. While the document contem-
plates an application to the Farmers Home Administra-
tion, as has already been discussed there is nothing in 
the contract which limits its vitality to a situation where 
such a loan application is accepted. 
A brief consideration of the facts of this case will 
clearly show that Kershaw, by his own acts, created title 
problems which had to be cleared through an action such 
as that herein and that it is accordingly appropriate that 
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attorney's fees be awarded, in accordance with the precise 
terms of Kershaw's written agreement. 
On December 2, 1970, Kershaw received formal, 
written notice (Exhibit P-7) that the option agreement 
(Exhibit P-4) had been accepted. This notice fulfilled 
the specific requirement of the agreement (a copy of 
which was delivered therewith — Tr. 512) as to the 
manner in which it was to be exercised and clearly noti-
fied Kershaw of the fact that Christensen claimed an 
interest in the property which is described in both the 
agreement and the notice. Notwithstanding this notifica-
tion to Kershaw of Christansen's claim, Kershaw pro-
ceeded to convey part of the exact same property to 
Rockefeller on December 17, 1970 (Exhibits D-7 and 
D-9), only fifteen days later, thus creating a title 
problem which could only be eliminated by litigation. 
By his own conscious act, Kershaw placed himself 
in a position where he was not able to convey an unen-
cumbered fee simple title to the property, as he had agreed 
to do. Under these circumstances, it was clearly war-
ranted for the trial court to award attorney's fees based 
on the specific agreement to pay such. 
POINT V. 
THE INTEREST WHICH BRADSHAW AC-
QUIRED AROSE PRIOR TO THE TIME 
THAT APPELLANT ROCKEFELLER AC-
QUIRED ITS INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY AND ROCKEFELLER WAS 
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NOT A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER EN-
TITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE RE-
CORDING ACT. 
In Point II of its Brief, Rockefeller contends that the 
recording statutes require a finding that its interest in 
the property is superior to that of the Respondent. A 
brief chronology of events might be helpful in considering 
this contention: 
July 20 or 21, 1970 — Date on which Kershaw testi-
fied he signed the option agreement (Exhibit 
P-4) covering the subject property (Tr. 510). 
August 8,1970 — Date of option agreement (Exhibit 
P-4). 
December 1, 1970 — Date of notice (Exhibit P-7) 
given by Christensen to Kershaw accepting the 
option. 
December 2, 1970 — Date on which Kershaw ack-
nowledged receiving the notice of acceptance of 
the option (Tr. 512). 
December 17, 1970 — Date of documents executed 
by Walter W. Kershaw and Helen G. Kershaw 
assigning interest in real and personal property 
to Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company 
(Exhibits D-7 and D-9). 
December 22,1970 — Kershaw to Rockefeller convey-
ances (Exhibits D-7 and D-9) recorded in the 
office of the Millard County Recorder. 
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December 23, 1970 — Kershaw to Christensen option 
(Exhibit P-4) recorded in the office of the Mil-
lard County Recorder. 
January 7, 1971 — Date of assignment of rights (Ex-
hibit P-5) under the Kershaw-Christensen op-
tion (Exhibit P-4) to Ronald Bradshaw. 
As the above chronology wiU help to illustrate, the 
option agreement (Exhibit P-4) under which Bradshaw 
claims, was executed more than four months prior to the 
time when Rockefeller acquired its interest in the subject 
property. The notice of acceptance of the option was 
also given by Christensen and received by Kershaw fif-
teen days prior to the date of the conveyance to Rocke-
feller. Under these circumstances, the after-acquired in-
terest of Rockefeller is clearly subject to the interest cre-
ated by the option agreement unless Rockefeller can 
qualify under the requirements of the Recording Act 
(Utah Code Annotated, § 57-3-3 (1953)), which provides 
as follows: 
"Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, 
which shall not be recorded as provided in this 
title, shall be void as against any subsequent 
purchaser in good faith and for a valuable con-
sideration of the same real estate, or any portion 
thereof, where his own conveyance shall be first 
duly recorded." 
Under the statute, the only way that Rockefeller's 
after-acquired interest in the property could have been 
held to have taken precedence over Bradshaw's interest 
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under the option agreement was if Rockefeller's evidence 
established that, 
1. Rockefeller acquired its interest for a valuable 
consideration; 
2. At a time when it had no actual or constructive 
notice of the interest created by the option agree-
ment; and 
3. That it was the first to place its interest of rec-
ord. 
As indicated above, Rockefeller's conveyance was re-
corded one day prior to the date on which the option 
agreement was recorded. In addition, the Rockefeller 
conveyances reflect that they were executed for valuable 
consideration and there is nothing in the record to suggest 
that this is untrue. Thus, the critical consideration is the 
notice or lack of notice that Rockefeller had at the time 
that it acquired its interest in the disputed property. 
An examination of this record will disclose that Rock-
efeller totally failed to meet its burden of proving that 
it purchased in "good faith". As the Respondent has 
elsewhere recounted, the evidence presented during the 
trial overwhelmingly established that the agents and em-
ployees of Rockefeller had both actual and constructive 
notice of the existence of the option and the claim of 
Christensen thereunder at the time that Rockefeller ac-
quired its interest. In the face of this evidence, Rocke-
feller simply rested its case, calling no witnesses at all 
to support its contention that it was a bona fide pur-
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chaser. The one witness that Rockefeller did call, Appel-
lant Kershaw, testified clearly that he personally advised 
the agents of Rockefeller, prior to the date of the con-
veyance to it, of the fact that Christensen did claim an 
interest in the subject property pursuant to an option 
agreement (Tr. 549, 550, 554, 555). 
The claim of Respondent Bradshaw to the property 
in question is based upon an instrument (the option 
agreement) which was executed and accepted prior to 
the date of the conveyance to Rockefeller. Inasmuch as 
the agents of Rockefeller had abundant actual and con-
structive notice of the existence of the option agreement 
and the resulting adverse interest in the property de-
scribed therein at the time that the subject property was 
conveyed to Rockefeller, its interest was acquired subject 
to the prior interest created by the option. The claim 
of Rockefeller that it has a prior interest is clearly un-
supported by the facts of the case and the law pertaining 
thereto. 
POINT VI. 
CHRISTENSEN DID NOT VIOLATE ANY 
DUTY IN HIS DEALINGS WITH KER-
SHAW. 
In Point I of their Brief, Rogers and Rockefeller 
suggest that Christensen (Respondent's assignor) may 
have violated a duty owed to Kershaw and that this 
should somehow affect Respondent's claim to the prop-
erty. 
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A review of the record in the case will disclose that 
Kershaw originally acquired an interest in the property 
which is the subject of this action with the intention of 
putting together a large-scale farming operation in Mil-
lard County. During the time that the properties were 
being acquired, Christensen acted as his agent. However, 
at the time that the option agreement (Exhibit P-4) was 
executed, in the summer of 1970, Kershaw had decided 
that he did not want to proceed with the proposed farm-
ing operation and he was anxious to have Mr. Christen-
sen take over his interest in the various pieces of prop-
erty in Millard County. At that point, Christensen's 
status as an agent (which had been limited in scope to 
the acquisition of properties) had terminated and he was 
at liberty to deal with Mr. Kershaw as any other pros-
pective purchaser might. (See 3 Am. Jur., 2d, "Agency", 
§ 230.) 
The written contract which was entered into (Ex-
hibit P-4) was in the interest of both Christensen and 
Kershaw. Kershaw testified specifically that he was will-
ing to give Christensen an option on all of his properties 
in Millard County (Tr. 531, 532), and that at the time 
bhait the option agreement was signed, Christensen was 
'working as a compatriot" and Kershaw hoped that he 
would be able to acquire all of the properties (Tr. 534). 
While Kershaw made certain assumptions relating 
to the effect on the option agreement of the denial of 
Christensen's loan application by the Farmers Home Ad-
ninistration which were inconsistent with Christensen's 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
view (and with the specific terms of the instrument), the 
fact remains that at the time that the option agreement 
was executed it was the clear intention of both Christen-
sen and Kershaw that an option be given. 
At the time that the option agreement was signed, 
the previously existing but limited agency relationship 
between Kershaw and Christensen had terminated. The 
two dealt with each other at arms length in an ordinary 
business transaction; there was no essential disagreement 
regarding what Kershaw was giving and Christensen was 
getting. While there was no specific duty on the part of 
Christensen to disclose any particular information to 
Kershaw, Kershaw was nevertheless made aware of the 
denial of the application by the Farmers Home Adminis-
tration and of the fact that Christensen accepted the op-
tion on December 1, 1970, fifteen days before Kershaw 
attempted to convey the property to Rockefeller. 
Appellants Rockefeller and Rogers have cited the 
case of Holland v. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P. 2d 989 
(1960), in support of their contention that Christensen 
violated some fiduciary duty to Kershaw. As the Court 
will recall, the Holland case involved a claim by the Hol-
land family against their attorney and his transferees 
for conduct on the part of the attorney in connection with 
the sale of certain mining claims in which the attorney 
had acquired an interest. This Court held that the attor-
ney's conduct in arranging to sell the client's three-fourths 
interest in the claims for $100,000 and his own one-fourth 
interest in the claims to the same purchaser for $287,000, 
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coupled with his concealment of the pertinent facts, con-
stituted fraud and a violation of his fiduciary duty. 
In the instant case, as has already been indicated, no 
agency relationship existed at the time of the agreement 
between Kershaw and Christensen. In addition, both 
parties to the option agreement fully understood what 
was being done — there was no concealment and relevant 
facts were fully disclosed. Thus, the Holland case is clearly 
distinguishable and it has no application at all to the 
present controversy. 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE 
CLAIM OF APPELLANT ROCKEFELLER 
LAND AND LIVESTOCK C O M P A N Y 
AGAINST APPELLANT KERSHAW. 
The Cross-Claim (R. 68) of Appellant Rockefeller 
against Appellant Kershaw alleges that Kershaw repre-
sented and warranted certain things to Rockefeller in 
connection with the transaction which took place on De-
cember 17, 1970, and that if the Court determined that 
the Plaintiff (Respondent herein) was entitled to the 
property, Rockefeller should be awarded a judgment 
over against Kershaw. 
Respondent has no actual stake in the outcome of 
this issue, since it involves a dispute which is limited to 
the appellants. However, Respondent does have an in-
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terest in getting this case resolved, once and for all, and 
avoiding further hearings and a prolongation of the mat-
ter. Thus, a few comments regarding the Cross-Claim 
are offered. 
Following the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, Rocke-
feller called only one witness, Walter W. Kershaw, pur-
suant to Rule 43 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Neither Edward nor Willard Rogers testified and no agent 
or employee of Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company 
was called to the stand. Rockefeller apparently believed 
that the documentary evidence which was introduced, 
together with the testimony of Kershaw and the value 
testimony of Bradshaw's witness, Wilbur R. Harding, were 
sufficient to establish their right to a judgment over 
against Kershaw. 
Respondent believes that a few questions will help 
to illustrate that Rockefeller simply did not meet its 
burden of proof with respect to its Cross-Claim against 
Kershaw: 
1. Where is the warranty that Rockefeller claims 
was breached? Exhibit D-9 is only a Quit-Claim 
Deed and the warranty language in the second 
paragraph of Exhibit D-7 only guarantees that 
the assignee will take over the position of buyer 
under the Staples Escrow. 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to establish the 
amount of Rockefeller's damages? One claiming 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
39 
that he is entitled to recover damages has the 
burden of proving the amount of his damages. The 
Assignment form (Exhibit D-7) which was exe-
cuted by Kershaw simply substituted Rockefeller 
as the "Buyer" under the Staples Escrow, with 
an obligation to pay off the balance owing in 
order to get title to the property being held in 
escrow. No evidence was introduced concerning 
the amount owing on the Staples Escrow. The 
only way that the trial court could have calculated 
Rockefeller's damages would have been to have 
subtracted the amount owing on the Staples Es-
crow from the value of the property — this was 
impossible since no evidence was introduced with 
respect to the balance owing on the Staples Es-
crow. In addition, the conveyances from Kershaw 
to Rockefeller (Exhibits D-7 and D-9) describe 
property other than the 480 acres claimed by 
Bradshaw. No evidence was introduced regard-
ing this property, its status or the value thereof. 
Here again, this obsence of proof gave the trial 
court no way to calculate Rockefeller's alleged 
damages. 
These unanswered questions are only intended to be 
llustrative of the fact that the record was not sufficient 
t the time that Appellant Rockefeller rested to justify 
he trial court in awarding it a judgment over against 
Appellant Kershaw. In view of this failure of proof, the 
[ismissal of the Cross-Claim of Rockefeller was correct. 
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CONCLUSION 
This case was presented to the Trial Court over a 
period of four full days. The parties had a full and an 
adequate opportunity to present evidence and legal au-
thorities to the Trial Court supporting their positions 
with respect to the issues. In view of the extensive evi 
dence presented by Bradshaw and the rather remarkable 
failure on the part of the other parties to introduce testi-
monial or documentary evidence, the Trial Court properly 
granted Bradshaw the relief that he had requested. The 
decision of the Trial Court was supported by clear and 
convincing evidence and the Judgment and Order should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL 
PHILIP C. PUGSLEY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Ronald Bradshaw 
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